Nicole H. Code f.k.a. Nicole L. Handrahan v. Utah Department of Health and Utah School for the Deaf and Blind : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Nicole H. Code f.k.a. Nicole L. Handrahan v. Utah
Department of Health and Utah School for the
Deaf and Blind : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brad C. Smith; Benjamin C. Rasmussen; Stevenson & Smith, PC; Attorneys for Appellant.
Brent A. Burnett; Debra J. Moore; Office of Utah Attorney General; Attorney for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Code v. Utah Department of Health, No. 20060372 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6460
BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
NICOLE H. CODE., f.k.a. NICOLE L. 
HANDRAHAN, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
and UTAH SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF 
AND BLIND, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 20060372-SC 
On Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Brent A. Burnett 
Debra J. Moore 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
Facsimile: (801) 366-0101 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Facsimile: (801) 399-9954 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COHRTS 
AUG 18 2w» 
BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
NICOLE H. CODE., f.k.a. NICOLE L. 
HANDRAHAN, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
and UTAH SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF 
AND BLIND, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 20060372-SC 
On Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Brent A. Burnett Ogden, UT 84403 
Debra J. Moore Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Office of the Utah Attorney General Facsimile: (801) 399-9954 
Litigation Division 
160 East 300 South Attorneys for Appellant 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
Facsimile: (801) 366-0101 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ii 
Table of Authorities iii 
Cases iii 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions iii 
Jurisdiction 1 
Issues Presented for Review 1 
Controlling Rules 1 
Statement of the Case 2 
Summary of Arguments 3 
Argument 4 
Conclusion 9 
Certificate of Mailing 10 
Addendum 
Exhibit A Order Granting Writ of Certiorari 
Exhibit B District Court Memorandum Decision 
Exhibit C District Court Order of Dismissal 
Exhibit D Court of Appeals Order 
Exhibit E Court of Appeals Opinion 
ii 
Table of Authorities 
Cases 
A.J. MacKay Co. v. Okland Const. Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991) 4 
Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982) 5 
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997) 1 
Code v. Utah Dep't. of Health, 2006 UT App 113, 133 P.3d 438 5-7 
Cox v. Krammer, 2003 UT App 264, 76 P.3d 184 4 
Harris v. IES Assoc, Inc., 2003 UT App 113, 69 P.3d 297 5 
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46, 68 P.3d 1008 . . . 7 
Serrano v. Utah Transit Authority, 2000 UT App 299, 13 P.3d 616 5 
State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, 63 P.3d 621 4 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 1 
Utah Code Judic. Admin. R. 4-504 (2003) 7 
Utah R. App. P. 3 1,4 
Utah R. App. P. 4 2, 4 
Utah R. Civ. P. 1 4 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60 7 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f) 2-9 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26 5 
iii 
Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
Issues Presented for Review 
This case is before the Court on a Writ of Certiorari. Pursuant to this 
Court's Order, the sole issue to be considered is "Whether the court of appeals 
lacked appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal in this case." Exhibit A, 
Order Granting Plaintiffs Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law. See. Carrier v. Pro-
Tech Restoration. 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997). 
Controlling Rules 
Utah R. App. P. 3 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from 
a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal 
from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing 
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 
4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice 
of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such 
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of 
the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal as well as the award of attorney 
fees. 
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Utah R. App. P. 4 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice 
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 
days after the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from.... 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f) 
(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order 
entered in writing, not included in a judgment.... 
(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party 
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, served upon the other parties a 
proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the 
proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing 
the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or 
upon expiration of the time to object. 
Statement of the Case 
On July 8, 2004, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this matter. (R. at 1-5.) An 
Amended Complaint was filed October 27, 2004. (R. at 55-59.) Defendants filed 
a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint based on Governmental Immunity. (R. at 10-
11, 64-66.) On January 10, 2005, the district court filed a memorandum decision 
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Exhibit B, Memorandum Decision.) 
The Court made no instructions regarding the preparation of an order and 
Defendant did not prepare an order as provided by Utah R. Civ. P. 7. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs counsel prepared an order dismissing the case, which was 
signed by the district court on February 25, 2005. (Exhibit C, Order of Dismissal.) 
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Plaintiff timely filed its Notice of Appeal from the February 25, 2005 Order of 
Dismissal. (R. at 76-78.) 
Defendants subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Disposition arguing 
that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction because the district court's 
Memorandum Decision constituted a final order. Plaintiff responded and on May 
19, 2005 the Court of Appeals reserved ruling on the motion pending briefing on 
the merits. (Exhibit D, Court of Appeals Order.) Subsequent to briefing on the 
merits of the appeal, the Court of Appeals issued the opinion at issue here on 
March 23, 2006, dismissing Plaintiffs appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (Exhibit E, 
Court of Appeals Opinion.) 
Summary of Arguments 
The appellate courts have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs appeal in this matter 
as Plaintiff timely appealed from the final order of the district court. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(f) requires that for every court order, the prevailing party shall prepare an 
order in conformity with the Court's decision, unless the Court signs a previously 
submitted proposed order, "or unless otherwise directed by the court." While the 
district court's memorandum decision used language that created an illusion of 
finality, the district court's decision must be read in light of the guidelines of Rule 
7(f). When Rule 7(f) is applied, the district court's decision was not final absent 
counsel's preparation of an order. Defendants' counsel having chosen not to 
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prepare an order, Plaintiffs counsel properly prepared the order, and appealed 
therefrom, thus vesting the appellate courts with jurisdiction. 
Argument 
I. Given the Language of Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), the Memorandum 
Decision of the District Court Was Not a Final Judgment or Order. 
"[The Rules of Civil Procedure] shall govern the procedure in the courts of 
the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature ... except 
as governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the 
Legislature..." Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a). "When interpreting court rules, we apply our 
rules of statutory construction with an understanding that rules, like statutes, are 
'passed as a whole and not as parts or sections.'" Cox v. Krammer. 2003 UT App 
264,flO, 76 P.3d 184, citing, State v. Maestas. 2002 UT 123, fl54, 63 P.3d 621. 
Under Utah R. App. P. 3(a), "An appeal may be taken from a district or 
juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final 
orders and judgments...by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court 
within the time allowed by Rule 4." Utah R. App. P. 4 requires an appeal to be 
filed within 30 days after the entry of the order appealed from. The absence of a 
final judgment generally deprives the appellate courts of jurisdiction. See. A.J. 
MacKav Co. v. Okland Const. Co.. Inc.. 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991). 
Likewise, failure to timely file a notice of appeal following entry of a final judgment 
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or order deprives the Court of jurisdiction. See. Serrano v. Utah Transit Authority. 
2000 UT App 299, ff7, 13 P.3d 616. 
"[A]n order is final where 'the effect of the order... was to determine 
substantial rights ... and to terminate finally the litigation..."' Harris v. IES Assoc. 
Inc.. 2003 UT App 113, fl56, 69 P.3d 297, citing. Cahoon v. Cahoon. 641 P.2d 
140,142 (Utah 1982). The memorandum decision issued by the district court in 
this case did not finally terminate the litigation. 
The Court of Appeals erroneously reached the opposite conclusion. The 
Court of Appeals focused solely on the last sentence of the district court's 
memorandum decision, which stated, "For the reasons stated above, the Court 
dismisses Plaintiffs claim." Under the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, "No 
further order was invited or contemplated by the terms of the Memorandum 
Decision, nor is such even implied by the decision's language." Code v. Utah 
Dep't. of Health. 2006 UT App 113, fl4, 133 P.3d 438. 
However, the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this regard, which looks 
only to the language of judicial precedent, runs directly contrary to the governing 
rules of procedure.1 Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) states in pertinent part, "Unless the 
court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or 
unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen 
1The Rules of Criminal Procedure contain a similar requirement. See. Utah 
R. Crim. P. 26 (a), (b). 
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days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in 
conformity with the court's decision." (Italics added.) Rule 7(f)(1) defines "order" 
to include "every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in writing, 
not included in a judgment." 
Under the plain language of Rule 7, for every order, not included in a 
judgment, the prevailing party is to submit an order in conformity with the court's 
decision, unless otherwise directed. The language of the rule makes such action 
mandatory. This is clearly at odds with the holding of the Court of Appeals, which 
held that because the district court dismissed the claim without inviting 
preparation of an order by counsel, it left nothing more to be done. Code, at fl6. 
The Court of Appeals further reasoned that the district court's language, although 
it did not specifically direct counsel, implicitly directed prevailing counsel not to file 
a proposed order. ]d- However, Rule 7(f) does not invite counsel to divine the 
intentions of the district court in this regard. Rule 7(f) plainly states that unless 
the district court signs a previously submitted order, or unless the district court 
otherwise directs, the prevailing party shall prepare an order. Under Rule 7(f), 
the memorandum decision of the district court explained the court's rationale and 
set forth the direction of the Court. Action was still required on the part of the 
Defendant to bring finality to the case. Had Plaintiff appealed from the 
memorandum decision, the appeal would have been premature and the Court of 
Appeals would have lacked jurisdiction. 
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In her concurring opinion, Judge McHugh came closer to the correct 
analysis, but still missed the mark. She noted the plain language of the rule, but 
wrote it off as nothing more than a conflict between court precedent and the rule, 
which "can lead to confusion for practitioners." Code, at fl11, (McHugh, J. 
concurring.) Judge McHugh's reasoning was equally misplaced as that of the 
majority opinion, by concluding that the apparent conflict between appellate court 
precedent and the Rules of Civil Procedure should be written off as nothing more 
than potentially confusing. 
The likelihood of confusion that Judge McHugh noted in her concurring 
opinion is abundantly evident in the decision of the Court of Appeals as this case 
should require nothing more than to read and apply the literal language of Rule 
7(f)(2).2 Indeed, the rule as articulated by the Court of Appeals mischieviously 
creates more confusion for the members of the bar than it resolves. Instead of 
relying on the plain application of Rule 7(f) upon receipt of a judge's 
2Our research revealed only one appellate opinion where the interplay 
between finality and Rule 7(f) was even mentioned. In Oseauera v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange. 2003 UT App 46, 1[4, 68 P.3d 1008, a district court entered 
a judgment, which the Court of Appeals noted "precluded the usual circulation 
among the parties of a proposed judgment and the opportunity to object prior to 
its entry" under Utah Code Judic. Admin. R 4-504(1), (2) (2003), the predecessor 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f). The Court of Appeals stated nothing more concerning the 
issue in the case, nor does it appear to have considered whether the predecessor 
to Rule 7 may have prevented the finality of a judgment that might otherwise 
appear final. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had abused its 
discretion in refusing to award relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), where the 
party had no notice of the entry of judgment, id- at fi12. 
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memorandum decision, practicioners will have to play a guessing game to divine 
the court's intentions. This case demonstrates just how prejudicial the results of 
such a game can be on parties to litigation - A correct guess allows the case to 
proceed, while an incorrect guess scuttles appeal rights. Whereas simple 
application of Rule 7(f) does away with the potential for inconsistent conclusions. 
In this case, the trial court issued a memorandum decision, which falls 
squarely under the procedure spelled out by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). The 
memorandum decision did not bring finality to the case, but consistent with the 
rule, required the preparation of an order by the Defendant as prevailing party 
because the district court did not otherwise direct. When no such order was 
prepared, Plaintiff prepared an order in conformity with the trial court's decision, 
which was signed by the trial court notwithstanding Defendant's finality 
objections, and timely appealed therefrom. A further order was contemplated and 
required by Rule 7(f). Plaintiffs order prepared pursuant thereto, once signed by 
the trial court, constituted the final order for purposes of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Plaintiffs timely appeal therefrom vested the Court of Appeals with 
jurisdiction. The decision of the Court of Appeals holding to the contrary should 
be reversed by this Court. 
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Conclusion 
A determination of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this matter 
requires simple application of the plain language of Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f). The 
district court's memorandum decision did not bring finality to the case because it 
did not so explicitly direct. Under Rule 7(f), given the absence of contrary 
indication from the district court, counsel was required to prepare an order to 
confirm the direction of the district court. Given Defendants' failure to prepare a 
proposed order as required by rule, Plaintiffs counsel appropriately prepared an 
order for the district court's signature to conform to Rule 7(f)'s requirement. This 
order was the final order in the case, and Plaintiff timely filed its appeal 
subsequent to its entry. The opinion of the Court of Appeals determining that it 
lacked jurisdiction was incorrect as a matter of law, and should be accordingly 
reversed. 
DATED this day of August, 2006. 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Brad C. Smith 
Benjamin C Rasmussen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this / o day of August, 2006,1 mailed, postage 
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, to the 
following individuals: 
Brent A. Burnett 
Debra A. Moore 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 ( S S ^ ; ^ 
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Exhibit A 
Order on Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
April 24, 2006 
IN THE SUPREME COURT-OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Nicole H. Code, f.k.a. 
Nicole L. Handrahan, 
FILED 
JUN 30 2006 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 20060372-SC 
20050255-CA 
Utah Department of Health and 
Utah School for the Deaf and Blind, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on April 24, 2006. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted only as to the following issue: 
Whether the court of appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the appeal in this case. 
A briefing schedule will issue hereafter. Pursuant to rule 
2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that permits 
the parties to stipulate to an extension of tame to submit their 
briefs on the merits. The parties shall not 'be permitted to 
stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, no extensions will be granted by motion. The 
parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon its 
issuance. 
FOR THE COURT: 
y^/ 10 %06A 
/ Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
Exhibit B 
District Court Memorandum Decision 
January 10, 2005 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
NICOLE H. CODE, f.k.a NICOLE L. 
HANDRAHAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, and 
UTAH SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND i 
BLIND, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
Case No. 040905007 
Plaintiff commenced this action claiming that Defendant Utah School for the Deaf and 
Blind ("USDB") wrongfully terminated her employment without allowing her the notice and 
grievance procedures. According to the Plaintiff, USDB terminated her as it would have 
terminated a temporary employee, although it should have treated her as a permanent employee. 
Plaintiff claims that her former employer, Defendant Utah Department of Health, failed to update 
her employment status properly prior to her lateral transfer to the USDB. 
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that (1) Plaintiff was a statutory 
employee rather than a contractual employee and, thus, cannot prevail on a contractual theory; (2) 
as a statutory employee, her wrongful termination claim arises from the Utah Personnel 
Management Act ("PMA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-1 to 67-19-42, statute, and, thus, 
Plaintiffs failure to commence the claim within three years of its accrual bars it as untimely 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No 040905007 
Page 2 of 5 
under Utah Code Ami. § 78-12-26(4); and (3) the Governmental Immunity Act ("GIA") also bars 
Plaintiffs wrongful termination action because she failed to file a notice of claim, Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-12(2000). 
For her part, Plaintiff argues that, because the USDB treated her as a temporary 
employee, which the PMA exempts from its raree/ service protections against termination 
without sufficient cause, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-15(l)(l), § 67-19-18, her employment arose 
not from statute but from a contract expressed by the State Human Resources Employee 
Handbook. Thus, Plaintiff argues, her cause of action is contractual, and she timely commenced 
it within the four-year statute of limitations for actions arising from a contract. Utah Code Aim. § 
78-12-25(1). Further, Plaintiff argues that Utah Code Ann. § 62-30-5 exempts her breach of 
contract claim from the GIA's notice requirement. 
The Court grants Defendants' motion under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff has failed to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
If Plaintiff s claim is true that she was a permanent employee and that the USDB had to 
follow termination procedures and hear her grievances as required by the PMA, then her claim is 
statutory rather than contractual, and it must fail because it was not brought within the three-year 
statute of limitations period and she did not file the notice of claim as required under the GIA. 
On the other hand, if Plaintiff s claim that she was a permanent employee was mistaken, 
then her wrongful termination claim must fail because, as a temporary employee, she had no right 
to insist upon the statutory grievance procedures that the PMA provides. Further, because the 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 040905007 
Page 3 of 5 
PMA requires the State to establish rules for personnel management, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-6 
to 67-19-10, a human resources employee handbook explaining those rules cannot create a 
contractual obligation outside of the authorization of the PMA, and, thus, Plaintiffs claim still 
must arise under the authority of the PMA. 
Plaintiff correctly notes thai a personnel policy manual can form the basis for a contract. 
See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992) (holding that "[ejmployees 
necessarily rely on a county's statement of procedures governing layoffs and conduct themselves 
accordingly," and "the expectations created by a personnel policies manual justify such a 
reliance."). However, even if the employee handbook is sufficient to form the basis of a 
contractual obligation, as the embodiment of the rules adopted by the State Department of 
Human Resource Management ("the Department") as authorized by the PMA, the handbook does 
not alter or amend the terms of public employment under the PMA. Because the PMA relies 
upon the Department to create rules enumerating the specific terms of employment PMA for 
some classes of employees, the PMA essentially incorporates those rules, and thus, they cannot 
alter or amend the terms of employment under the PMA. Therefore, the handbook has no impact 
on the Plaintiffs status as a statutory employee. Although Plaintiff arguably might maintain a 
suit to enforce the terms of the employee handbook, as a statutory employee, her claim would 
arise from the PMA rather than from a contract for purposes of the statute of limitations and the 
GIA. 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 040905007 
Page 4 of 5 
Thus, even if the Court takes the allegations of Plaintiff s claim as true, her failure to file 
a timely notice of claim under the GIA and her failure to commence her action within tliree years 
of its accrual deprive the Court of jurisdiction. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claim. 
Dated this / D day ol January, 2005. 
Erme W. Jones, Judge 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 040905007 
Page 5 of 5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 11/ day of January, 2005,1 sent a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ruling to counsel as follows: 
Brad C. Smith 
Benjamin C. Rasmussin 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Geoffrey T. Landward 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Attorney for Defendants 
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District Court Order for Dismissal 
February 25, 2005 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
NICOLE H. CODE, f.k.a. NICOLE L. 
HANDRAHAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, and 
UTAH SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND 
BLIND, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
&Aft 0 1 zm 
Civil No. 040905007 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. 12(b)(6). The Court having been fully apprised of this matter and having 
issued its Memorandum Decision dated 10 January 2005, and based therefore, the 
Court orders that Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice 
DATED this,2if day of February, 2005. 
sf 
(Dismissed with prejudice) 
VD18336280 
35007 UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
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Exhibit D 
Order of Court of Appeals 
May 19, 2005 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY 1 9 2005 
Nicole H. Code, fka Nicole 
L. Handrahan 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Utah Department of Health and 
Utah State School for the 
Deaf and Blind, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20050255-CA 
Th i s m a t t e r i s b e f o r e t h e c o u r t on A p p e l l e e s ' s m o t i o n f o r 
summary d i s p o s i t i o n f o r l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n . -
A p p e l l e e c o n t e n d s t h e Memorandum D e c i s i o n of J a n u a r y 10, 
2005 was a f i n a l , a p p e a l a b l e judgment , and t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l 
was n o t t i m e l y . A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e memorandum d e c i s i o n 
was n o t a f i n a l o r d e r p u r s u a n t t o r u l e 7 ( f ) of t h e U t a h Ru les of 
C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , a n d t h a t t h e a p p e a l was t i m e l y f i l e d w i t h i n 
t h i r t y days of e n t r y of t h e F e b r u a r y 25 , 2 005 o r d e r o f d i s m i s s a l . 
We d e f e r a r u l i n g on t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h e 
mot ion and r e s p o n s e p e n d i n g f u l l b r i e f i n g of t h e a p p e a l and 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e c o u r t . See Utah R. App. P . 1 0 ( f ) ("As t o 
any i s s u e r a i s e d by a m o t i o n f o r summary d i s p o s i t i o n , t h e c o u r t 
may d e f e r i t s r u l i n g u n t i l p l e n a r y p r e s e n t a t i o n and c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
of t h e c a s e . " ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED t h a t t h e mot ion f o r summary d i s p o s i t i o n 
i s d e n i e d , and a r u l i n g on t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d t h e r e i n i s d e f e r r e d 
p e n d i n g p l e n a r y p r e s e n t a t i o n and c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e c a s e . The 
a p p e a l s h a l l p r o c e e d t o t h e n e x t s t a g e . 
Dated t h i s 
FOR THE COURT: 
n day of May, 2005 
mdith M. Billings, <J Ju it  
Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Before Judges Bench, McHugh, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
fl We have determined that n[t]he facts and legal arguments are 
adequately presented in the briefs and record [,] and the 
decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral 
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). We conclude we lack 
jurisdiction over this appeal because Appellant's notice of 
appeal was untimely. 
%2 Under rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an 
appeal is allowed from "final orders and judgments." Utah R. 
App. P. 3(a). The rules also specify that the notice of appeal 
must be filed "within 3 0 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Thus, 
the thirty-day period begins with the entry of a judgment or 
other final order. 
3^ "[F]or a judgment to be final and start the time for appeal 
to run, there must be a judgment which is definite and 
unequivocal in finally disposing of the matter." Utah State 
Bldcr. Bd. v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 P.2d 141, 
144 (1965) . The district court's Memorandum Decision here was 
just such a disposition, explicitly dismissing Appellant's claim. 
"The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that an order is final 
where 'the effect of the order . . . was to determine substantial 
rights . . . and to terminate finally the litigation' . . . ." 
Harris v. 1ES Assocs., inc., 2003 UT App 112,1(56, 69 P.3d 297 
(first: and second omissions in original) (citation omitted). The 
parties' substantive rights in this case were definitively and 
unequivocally determined by the Memorandum Decision; the 
decision's unambiguous language was clearly intended to end the 
litigation. 
1|4 At the end of its signed Memorandum Decision, after setting 
forth its thorough legal analysis, the district court concluded: 
"For the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's 
claim." No further order was invited or contemplated by the 
terms of the Memorandum Decision, nor is such even implied by the 
decision's language. Cf. State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2,1(9, 65 
P.3d 1180 (n[W]here further action is contemplated by the express 
language of the order, it cannot be a final determination 
susceptible of enforcement.") (emphasis added). Thus, Appellant 
had thirty days from the date the Memorandum Decision was 
entered--January 10, 2005--to file her notice of appeal. The 
notice was not filed, however, until March 8, 2005--long after 
the thirty-day period had ended. We therefore lack jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal. See Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT 
App 299,17, 13 P.3d 616, cert, denied, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001). 
1f5 Appellant disagrees, arguing that the relevant date to 
determine timeliness of the appeal is February 25, 2 005, the date 
the district court signed the order of dismissal that she 
eventually submitted. The subsequent order, however, did not 
restart the time for appeal because the order did not alter the 
substantive rights of the parties in any way; it did nothing more 
than reiterate the dismissal already fully effectuated by the 
Memorandum Decision.1 See Foster v. Montgomery, 2 0 03 UT App 
4 05,1(18, 82 P.3d 191 ("Where a judgment is reentered, and the 
subsequent judgment does not alter the substantive rights 
affected by the first judgment, the time for appeal runs from the 
xThe order, in its entirety, simply states: "This matter 
came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court having been fully 
apprised of this matter and having issued its Memorandum Decision 
dated 10 January 20 05, and based there[on], the Court orders that 
Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice." 
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first judgment.") (internal quotations and citation omitted), 
cert, denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004). 
f6 Appellant additionally argues that the January 10 order was 
not final because further action was required by rule 7 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "the 
prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's 
decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in 
conformity with the court's decision." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f) (2) . 
This, however, is simply the default rule that applies to those 
situations where responsibility for preparation of the court's 
order has not been "otherwise directed by the court."2 Id. When 
the court issues its own Memorandum Decision, which explicitly 
and unambiguously dismisses the underlying claim without inviting 
submission of a further order, it leaves nothing more to be done. 
Such clear action by the trial court necessarily serves under 
rule 7(f)(2) as direction from the court that the prevailing 
party need not draft an order, and thus renders the Memorandum 
Decision final and appealable. 
%7 Accordingly, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
f8 I CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
McHUGH, Judge (concurring): 
1|9 I concur in the main opinion. I write separately to address 
the possible confusion created by the conflict between the 
controlling precedent and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
2Appellant's reliance on the plain language of rule 7 is 
paradoxical at best, as Appellant was not "the prevailing party" 
and did not submit her proposed order "within fifteen days after 
the court's decision." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). Nor did the 
district court "direct []" Appellant, rather than the prevailing 
party, to submit an order. Id. 
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cases from this court and the Utah Supreme Court that are cited 
by the majority hold that a decision of the trial court that 
fully determines the substantive rights of the parties is final 
for purposes of appeal absent express language to the contrary. 
See State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2,1(9, 65 P.3d 1180; Harris v. 
IES Assocs. , 2003 UT App 112,1|56, 69 P.3d 297. 
1fl0 However, rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides, in relevant part: 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction 
of che court, including a minute order 
entered in writing, not included in a 
judgment. . . . 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the 
proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by 
the court, the prevailing party shall, within 
fifteen days after the court's decision, 
serve upon the other parties a proposed order 
in conformity with the court's decision. 
Objections to the proposed order shall be 
filed within five days after service. The 
party preparing the order shall file the 
proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to 
object. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).1 
Kll Thus, while the clear precedent from Utah appellate courts 
holds that a decision of the trial court is final for purposes of 
appeal unless the written decision expressly requires further 
action, see Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2 at 1|9; Harris, 2003 UT App 112 
at 1f56, rule 7(f) contemplates that a subsequent order will be 
entered after every decision unless the court directs otherwise, 
see Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f). The presumption under the Utah Supreme 
xThe substance of what is now rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure was previously contained in the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501 to 4-509 
(noting that rule 4-504 was repealed effective November 1, 2003, 
and replaced with a comparable provision in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure). Effective November 1, 2003, subpart (f) was 
added to rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah 
R. Civ. P. 7 & amendment notes (providing that the 2 003 
amendment, which added subpart (f), became effective November 1, 
2003). 
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Court authority is in favor of finality, while the presumption in 
rule 7(f) is that a further order is required. Although the case 
law specifically addresses the issue of finality for purposes of 
appeal, while the rule is concerned with appropriate procedure, 
the interaction between the two can lead to confusion for 
practitioners. 
fl2 The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. 
See Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 200cfuT App 299,f7, 13 P.3d 
616. Consequently, correctly assessing the time at which a 
decision becomes final for purposes of appeal is critical. 
Because the procedure set forth in rule 7(f) may lull 
practitioners into the mistaken belief that a decision of the 
trial court does not become final for purposes of appeal until an 
order is entered, clarity in the initial memorandum decision is 
essential. I believe the better practice for all concerned is 
for the decision to state expressly either that "no further order 
is necessary" or that the prevailing party "shall prepare an 
order implementing this court's decision." 
fl3 I agree with the majority that the Memorandum Decision here 
completely resolved the substantive rights of the parties, 
dismissed the complaint, and did not expressly require any 
further action. Yet, I am sympathetic to the difficulty in 
assessing the proper moment when the decision becomes final for 
purposes of appeal when the trial court is silent on that issue. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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